



JSC Building 32 Facility Fault Tolerance

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
Agenda



- Purpose
- Background
- Methodology
- Findings/Lessons Learned
- Actions Taken
- Summary
- Questions

Purpose

- **Conduct a thorough analysis of the JSC Building 32 facility systems and utilities used to support test article integration activities in the facility and thermal-vacuum testing in Chamber A.**
 - Provide known risks and recommendations
 - Provide counsel on facility risk reduction priorities





Background

- Why did we conduct this review?

Primary: Identify risk to the James Webb Space Telescope program and provide recommendations on risk-reduction measures

Secondary: Validate and update the facility Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) in an effort to understand the facility's fault tolerance



Methodology



- **Step 1:** Identify all major facility systems & utilities

- Helium refrigeration plant(s)
- Liquid Nitrogen storage and distribution system
- Rough vacuum system
- High vacuum system(s)
- Chamber airflow management system
- Facility heating, ventilation, & air conditioning (HVAC)
- Normal & emergency power
- Data acquisition, recording, & controls system
- Facility steam system
- Facility chilled water system
- Cooling tower
- Closed loop cooling water
- Etc...



Methodology

- **Step 2:** Break systems down into components and/or sub-systems and populate into a matrix with supporting utilities.



Methodology

- **Step 3:** Identify system and utility dependencies and populate into the matrix.
 - Dependencies should be identified and evaluated for individual system components and/or subsystems to the extent possible
 - Start off by simply marking with an “X” if there is a dependency



Methodology

It should look something like this...



Methodology




- **Step 4:** Evaluate systems for component/subsystem loss to determine those that result in system shut down/failure.
 - This is in line with your Failure Modes & Effects Analysis (FMEA)
 - This needs to be evaluated for each phase of your test/operation (as applicable). For example:
 - Chamber @ rough vacuum, ambient temp
 - Chamber @ high vacuum, ambient temp
 - Chamber @ 80K (LN2 shrouds full cold)
 - Chamber < 80K, but > 32K (helium shrouds cooling)
 - Chamber < 32K (helium shrouds full cold)



Methodology: Helium Systems



Nominal Operations





Methodology: Helium Systems

Off-Nominal Operations




| Off-Nominal Ops | Criticality | Failure Mode | Cause | Effects |
|-----------------|-------------|----------------|---|--|
| Mode #1 | 2/3 | Helium Train 1 | Subsystem Single Point Failure: CMP1, CBX1 Loss of Utility | Loss of Refrigeration to Helium CryoPumping Panels (CPP) |
| Mode #2 | 2R | Compressor 3 | Single Point failure Loss of Utility | Loss of Refrigeration to main Helium shroud/TA Zones |
| Mode #3 | 2R | Coldbox 3 | Single Point failure | Loss of Refrigeration to main Helium shroud/TA Zones |
| Mode #4 | 2 | Helium Zones | Zone Leakage, Zone Control Valve Failure | Loss of thermal control of Helium Zone |
| Mode #5 | 2R | DARAC | Single Point failure | Loss of sub-system data monitoring and HMI control screens |
| Shutdown | 2 | Helium Plant | Loss of Utility | Loss of Refrigeration to Helium CPP, main Helium shroud/TA Zones |



Methodology: Helium Systems

Off-Nominal #1: Loss CW, CLCW, on Train 1





Methodology: Helium Systems



- Effect: Loss of Refrigeration to the Helium CryoPumping Panels
- Test Impacts: Criticality 2 / 3
 - Cooldown / Warm-Up: Released of Condensed Gas (“Burp”) from CPP
 - Steady State: Condensed Gas transfers to the main Helium Shrouds
- Controls:
 - System designed for 24-7 operations
 - TGL22 Turbine
 - MTBF: 190,500 hrs
 - MTTR: 3 hrs with spare
- Recommendation:
 - Re-commission Helium Train 2 (inactive) as back-up



Methodology

- **Step 5:** Define system categories & use your failure mode analysis in previous step to determine what utility or component losses result in you realizing one of these category levels
 - Examples:
 - Category 1 – Loss of system could result in personnel injury or loss of life
 - Category 2 – Loss of system could result in damage to test article or other critical facility hardware and ground support equipment
 - Category 3 – Loss of system could result in loss of test objective or schedule delay
 - Update matrix to show Category numbers in lieu of an “X” where applicable



Methodology

And you get something like this...



Methodology

- **Step 6: Eliminate or Mitigate your Risk**
 - All Category 1 must be eliminated
 - All Category 2 should be eliminated or must be controlled/mitigated through redundancy
 - Category 3 can be eliminated/controlled if schedule & budget allow



Methodology

- **Step 7:** Evaluate for existing redundancy & update matrix
 - Does the redundant system have same capacity as the primary?
 - Does the redundant system fully meet requirements?
 - Is the redundant system fully operational?
 - Does the redundant system require reconfiguration to be employed?
 - Are procedures in place?
 - Are people trained?
 - How long does it take to reconfigure?



Methodology

And you get something like this...




Methodology

- **Step 8:** Address remaining critical areas and develop controls and/or system redundancy in order to reduce risk to an acceptable level

So, after completing this process for JSC Building 32, this is what we found...

INTEGRATED MECHANICAL
SYSTEM





Findings/Lessons Learned

- No Critical 1 areas identified
 - Only a few Critical 2 areas were found
 - **Vacuum System:** Power & Cooling Water
 - **Helium Compressor (Train 3):** Cooling Water
 - **Chamber A Environmental Control:** Cooling Water

Actions Taken: Vacuum System

- Placed chamber rough vacuum system & cooling tower pumps/fans on emergency power
 - Replaced power distribution
 - Installed new transfer switches & breaker panels
 - Rental generator (2MW) & diesel tank provide 5 days run-time





Actions Taken: Helium Compressor 3

- Placing cooling tower pumps/fan on emergency power eliminates failure mode due to loss of cooling water to compressor 3
- Additionally, identified operational method providing redundancy on train 3 using the compressor from train 1
 - Requires temporary shutdown and minor reconfiguration of valves
 - Replicated failure during test and observed no thermal or contamination concerns for time required to reactivate system
 - Although Compressor 1 is smaller, it demonstrated sufficient capacity to cool and maintain temperatures on GHe shrouds



Actions Taken: Chamber Airflow Management System

- Installed fully-redundant backup system run off a 1MW generator
 - Ties into system at makeup air unit on roof





Summary

- Although a time-consuming process, we gained a much better understanding of our facility systems and their level of fault tolerance
- We have a clear understanding of our risk and are confident that a facility system/utility failure will not negatively impact sensitive/critical hardware in the chamber
- Strongly recommend others take the time to implement this or a similar process prior to the next test of critical hardware



Questions

